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Abstract
Multiagent decision-making problems in partially observable environments are
usually modeled as either extensive-form games (EFGs) within the game theory
community or partially observable stochastic games (POSGs) within the reinforce-
ment learning community. While most practical problems can be modeled in both
formalisms, the communities using these models are mostly distinct with little
sharing of ideas or advances. The last decade has seen dramatic progress in algo-
rithms for EFGs, mainly driven by the challenge problem of poker. We have seen
computational techniques achieving super-human performance, some variants of
poker are essentially solved, and there are now sound local search algorithms which
were previously thought impossible. While the advances have garnered attention,
the fundamental advances are not yet understood outside the EFG community. This
can be largely explained by the starkly different formalisms between the game
theory and reinforcement learning communities and, further, by the unsuitability of
the original EFG formalism to make the ideas simple and clear. This paper aims
to address these hindrances, by advocating a new unifying formalism, a variant of
POSGs, which we call Factored-Observation Games (FOGs). We prove that any
timeable perfect-recall EFG can be efficiently modeled as a FOG as well as relating
FOGs to other existing formalisms. Additionally, a FOG explicitly identifies the
public and private components of observations, which is fundamental to the recent
EFG breakthroughs. We conclude by presenting the two building-blocks of these
breakthroughs — counterfactual regret minimization and public state decomposi-
tion — in the new formalism, illustrating our goal of a simpler path for sharing
recent advances between game theory and reinforcement learning community.
1 Introduction
Sequential decision-making problems are one of the core topics of artificial intelligence research.
The ability of an artificial agent to perform actions, observe their consequences, and then perform
further actions to achieve a goal is instrumental to everything from robotics and autonomous driving
to medical decision diagnosis and automated personal assistants. Recent progress has led to un-
precedented results in many large-scale problems of this type. While conceptually simpler problems
can be modeled with perfect information or by regarding the other agents as stationary parts of
the environment, realistic models of real-world situations require rigorous treatment of imperfect
information and multiple independent decision-makers operating in a shared environment.
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There are two distinct lines of prior work studying sequential decision making in multiagent envi-
ronments with imperfect information: game theory and reinforcement learning. Both have a long
tradition and provide valuable insights, but often use different notation, assumptions, and models to
represent the problems. As a result, these lines of research were, for a long time, quite independent.
Their recent convergence shows great potential, but also reveals that none of the commonly used
formal models is suitable for analyzing the most recent algorithms.
We argue for a simple unified model, termed Factored Observation Game (FOG), that would allow
describing key results from both worlds, make the formal analysis of recent decomposition-based
algorithms easier, and promote further convergence of the communities.
Game Theory Extensive Form Games (EFG) are a natural extension of game trees to imperfect
information environments, which dates back to (Morgenstern and Von Neumann, 1953). EFGs model
imperfect information by grouping game states indistinguishable by a player into information sets
and defining an agent’s policy as a mapping from information sets to actions. While the model allows
for a very general class of games, it turns out that the core principle of arbitrary groupings of states
comes with complications. As researchers discover more and more issues with this model, they
tend to prohibit sub-classes of EFGs in which the information sets have “undesirable” properties.
Imperfect recall is one such example, where the structure of information sets can force an agent to
forget something they knew before. Not only is this assumption usually unrealistic, it also makes
many concepts and results complicated (Piccione et al., 1996; Piccione and Rubinstein, 1997), and
even the existence of equilibria becomes NP-hard (Hansen et al., 2007). Thus many key results and
algorithms for EFG assume perfect recall. (Non-)timeability is another, more recent, property of this
type (Jakobsen et al., 2016a). The observation is that since the passage of time should be observable
to the agents, some extensive form games cannot be “implemented in the real world”. Jakobsen et al.,
2016a thus argue that, similarly to perfect recall, timeability should be a common assumption in
EFGs.
Multiagent Reinforcement Learning Separate, but recently converging lines of research can be
traced to Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) (Bellman, 1957) and Stochastic Games (SGs) (Shapley,
1953). While the MDP formalism is for single-agent perfect information domains, researchers
soon generalized MDPs into partially observable MDPs (POMDPs) (Astrom, 1965). Based on this
formalism, (Kaelbling et al., 1998) present novel algorithms for planning and acting, using value
functions and sub-problems as crucial concepts. While stochastic games were introduced prior to
the MDP formalism, they can be well thought of as “multiagent MDPs”. Indeed, this connection
allowed (Littman, 1994) to generalize the Q-learning algorithm from MDPs to SGs. When it comes
to combining multiple agents and imperfect information, researchers introduced two formalisms:
Partially Observable Stochastic Games (POSGs) (Hansen et al., 2004a) and Decentralized POMDPs
(Dec-POMDPs) (Bernstein et al., 2002), where the agents share the same goal.
Decomposition of a large problem into smaller problems, solving them independently, and combining
the results into a solution of the original problem is one of the most fundamental solution techniques
in computer science. In perfect information games, if we want to select an optimal move in some
situation, we can estimate the value of the situations following all applicable actions. Each of these
values can be estimated independently, and the action leading to the highest value is selected. In
imperfect information games, an analogous approach comes with multiple complications. When a
player is thinking about their decision, they don’t know exactly what the current state of the game
is. They have to choose an action suitable for all states that are compatible with their (imperfect)
information. To do that, they have to assume some probability distribution over these states. This
probability distribution, however, typically depends on the likelihood of the opponent taking actions
leading to the current situation versus some other alternative actions. This likelihood depends
on the outcome the opponent could achieve using the alternative actions, which in turn typically
depends on the strategies both players would choose after those alternative actions. This way, the
optimal strategies in distinct situations in the game are interconnected, and, in general, one cannot be
computed without the other.
The only known method for decomposing imperfect information games is based on public knowledge
(Nayyar et al., 2013; Burch et al., 2014). In games like poker, where most of the information
created in the game is publicly announced (i.e., the size of the bets and board cards), the game can
be decomposed into subgames containing distinct public information and all possible consistent
private information. This form of decomposition was instrumental for creating poker bots that could
2
outperform human professionals in no-limit Texas hold’em poker (Moravcˇík et al., 2017; Brown and
Sandholm, 2017).
This idea of decomposition can be extended to other games and the requirement for public observations
can be weakened to common knowledge (Šustr et al., 2019): the information which all players know
and all players know that all players know it, etc. However, the formalism of extensive-form
games explicitly models only the information available to the acting player, and it is not possible
to consistently define the other players’ information without knowing more about the problem
than just its EFG model. Without additional knowledge about the task, it is therefore impossible
to consistently model the common knowledge and difficult to formally analyze decomposition in
imperfect information games. This suggests that maybe a new formal model is needed to make further
advances smoother and easier to communicate.
We have found that switching to FOGs, a slightly extended model of POSGs, makes reasoning
about decomposition much simpler, allows modeling almost all3 games with a model of a similar
size4, and allows better exposition and cross-fertilization of algorithmic ideas with the very active
communities of reinforcement learning and Dec-POMDP planning. Transferring results from POSGs
to FOGs is straightforward since we can ignore the factorization of observations. This paper creates
the necessary formal basis for transferring results form EFGs to FOGs. It proves that any timeable
perfect-recall EFG is equivalent to a POSG (and hence FOG) and shows the trade-offs in translating
one model to the other. It explains the difficulties with modeling the opponents’ information in EFGs,
complications with modeling common knowledge in general, and formally analyzes the advantages
and disadvantages of using FOGs with explicit labeling of public knowledge. It demonstrates the
transfer of results from EFGs to FOGs by formalizing two key components of DeepStack (Moravcˇík
et al., 2017) and Libratus (Brown and Sandholm, 2017): Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR)
and decomposition of a game into subgames.
2 Factored-Observation Game
We now describe the proposed model as a special case of a POSG. A Factored-Observation Game
(FOG) is a tuple G = 〈N ,W, wo,A, T ,R,O〉 s.t.:
• N = {1, . . . , N} is the player set.
• W is the set of world states and w0 ∈ W is a designated initial state.
• A = A1 × · · · × AN is the space of joint actions.
– The subsets Ai(w) ⊂ Ai and A(w) = A1(w)× · · · ×AN (w) ⊂ A specify the (joint)
actions legal at w ∈ W .
– For a ∈ A, we write a = (a1, . . . , aN ).
– Ai(w) for i ∈ N are either all non-empty or all empty. A world state with no legal
actions is terminal.
• After taking a (legal) joint action a at w, the transition function T determines the next
world state w′, drawn from the probability distribution T (w, a) ∈ ∆(W).
• We writeR = (R1, . . . ,RN ), whereRi(w, a) is the reward i receives when a joint action
a is taken at w.5
• O = (Opriv(1), . . . ,Opriv(N),Opub) is the observation function, where O(·) : W × A ×
W → O(·) specifies the private observation that i receives, resp. the public observation
that everybody receives, upon transitioning from world state w to w′ via some a.
– For each i, we write Oi(w, a,w′) =
(Opriv(i)(w, a,w′),Opub(w, a,w′)) ∈ Oi :=
Opriv(i) ×Opub, where O(.) denote the sets of possible observations.
Since FOG doesn’t explicitly send agents rewards and legal actions, this setting assumes the agents
have access to the full model of G. This goes naturally with the view that each agent implicitly
assigns some value to each world-state, and the rewards reflect the immediate changes in this value.
In particular, it is entirely possible for the agent to be uncertain about their reward.
We contrast this view with the alternative where rewards are a signal coming from the outside world.
While this isn’t a canonical part of FOGs, models of many domains will in fact have observations
3all timeable perfect-recall games
4quadratic in the worst case
5As is common in MDPs, we could equivalently consider rewards that depend on (w, a,w′), or just on w′.
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with separate side-channels for rewards and legal actions, and thus be of this second type. Such a
model is useful for describing and analyzing model-free learning agents, who don’t have direct access
to the full model of the problem.
2.1 Derived objects and the optimization criterion
From G, we derive the trees of histories and the cumulative rewards, which are similar to the objects
used in the EFG literature. Therefore, they allow reasoning about FOGs and proving their properties
by methods commonly used for EFGs.
• A legal history (or trajectory) is a finite sequence h = (w0, a0, w1, a1, . . . , wt), where
wk ∈ W , ak ∈ A(wk), and wk+1 ∈ W is in the support6 of T (wk, ak). We denote the set
of all legal histories byH.7
– Since the last state in each h ∈ H is uniquely defined, the notation for W can be
overloaded to work withH (e.g., A(h) := A(the last w in h), h being terminal, ...).
– We use g @ h to denote the fact that g is a prefix of h, and g v h to denote g is a prefix
of h or equal to h.
• The cumulative reward of i at h is∑t−1k=0 rki := ∑t−1k=0Ri(wk, ak). When h is a terminal
history, cumulative rewards can also be called utilities.
The observations in G induce the corresponding information-set trees. We use these to define the
notion of a strategy, which turns G into a well-defined problem: the goal of each player is to choose a
policy in a way that maximizes their expected cumulative reward.
• Player i’s action-observation history at h = (w0, a0, w1, a1, . . . , wt) is the sequence
si(h) := (O
0
i , a
0
i , O
1
i , a
1
i , . . . , O
t
i), where O
k
i = Oi(wk−1, ak−1, wk).8 The space Si of all
such sequences can be viewed as the information state space of i.
– We assume that i’s information states determine which i’s actions are legal:
(∀g, h ∈ H) : si(g) = si(h) =⇒ Ai(g) = Ai(h) =: Ai (si(h)).
• A policy profile is a tuple pi = (pi1, . . . , piN ), where each policy (also called a strategy)
pii : si ∈ Si 7→ pii(si) ∈ ∆(Ai(si)) specifies the probability distribution from which i
draws their next action (conditional on having information si).
Finally, the factorization of each observation into the private and public parts allows us to define the
tree of public states:
• The public state corresponding to h = (w0, a0, w1, a1, . . . , wt) is the sequence spub(h) :=
spub(si(h)) :=
(
O0pub, O
1
pub, . . . , O
t
pub
)
of all public observations corresponding to h, where
each Okpub comes from O
k
i = (O
k
priv(i), O
k
pub).
– The space Spub of all public states is called the public tree.
3 Connections to Existing Models
We now describe the correspondence between EFGs, models used in RL, and FOGs.
3.1 Extensive Form Games
Extensive form games are a framework for analyzing sequential decision making, which assumes
that only one player acts in each decision point of the game. Simultaneous moves can be represented
by hiding opponents’ move choices. EFGs are assumed to be finite, and the rewards (typically called
utilities) are only awarded at terminal states. In this section, we show a relationship between timeable
EFGs with perfect recall and finite-horizon FOGs. We now recall the definitions of the EFG model,
6For finiteW , being in support of some probability measure µ ∈ ∆(W ) is equivalent to having a non-zero
probability under µ.
7To simplify the discussion, we assume thatH is finite. This can always be enforced by using finite horizon
T , but some domains satisfy this assumption naturally. Moreover, our results generalize into the standard
γ-discounted rewards setting.
8We assume that the start of the game gets announced by some Oi(−,−, w0). This is important for
model-free agents, who might need to receive some observation to know which actions are available to them.
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timeability and perfect recall and formulate the main results, while more details and proofs can be
found in Appendix C.
Based on (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994), an EFG is a tuple F = (H,Z,A,N ,P, σc, u, I), where
• H is the set of histories, representing sequences of actions.
• Z is the set of terminal histories (those z ∈ H which are not a prefix of any other history).
• For a non-terminal history h ∈ H \ Z , A(h) := {a | ha ∈ H} is the set of actions
available at h.
• N = {1, . . . , N} is the player set, where c is a special player, called “chance” or “nature”.
• P : H \ Z → N ∪ {c} is the player function partitioning non-terminal histories intoHi,
i = 1, . . . , N, c depending on which player acts at h.
• The strategy of chance is a fixed probability distribution σc over actions inHc.
• The utility function u = (ui)i∈N assigns to each terminal history z a reward ui(z) ∈ R
received by each player upon reaching z.
• The information-partition I = (Ii)i∈N captures the imperfect information of G. For
each player, Ii is a partition of Hi. If g, h ∈ Hi belong to the same I ∈ Ii then i cannot
distinguish between them. For each I ∈ Ii, the available actionsA(h) are the same for each
h ∈ I , and we overload A(·) as A(I) := A(h).
A behavioral strategy σi ∈ Σi of player i assigns to each I ∈ Ii a probability distribution σi(I)
over available actions a ∈ A(I). A tuple σ = (σi)i∈N ∈ Σ is called a strategy profile. When
solving an EFG, the goal is typically to find a strategy profile σ∗, called Nash equilibrium, where no
player can increase their expected utility by deviating from σ∗.
Timeability: A transition in E is any triplet (h, a, ha), where h ∈ H, a ∈ A(h). A transition-
timing in E is any mapping τ that assigns to each triplet its duration τ(h, a, ha) ∈ [1,∞). A
timing corresponding to τ is ϕτ : H → [0,∞) : h = (h0, a0, h1, . . . , ht) 7→ τ(h0, a0, h1) + · · · +
τ(ht−1, at−1, ht). Inspired by (Jakobsen et al., 2016b), we say that E is τ -timeable if every two
histories from the same information set have the same timing ϕτ (·).
In FOGs, we define timeability analogously, requiring that for any histories g, h, ϕτ (g) = ϕτ (h)
holds whenever si(g) = si(h) for some agent i.
h1
g1
1 0
h2
g2
1 0
h3
g3
1 0 1 0 0 1
. .
.
. .
.
. .
. . . . hN−1
gN−1 gN
Figure 1: In this two-player EFG, the dotted nodes
do not exist, and transitioning from hn to gn by
going left takes N − n units of time. After adding
the dotted nodes, each transition takes exactly 1
unit of time. However, this increases the size of
the game from linear to quadratic in N .
Perfect recall: Informally, an agent has per-
fect recall if they don’t forget information they
had in the past (Kuhn, 1953). In EFGs, this
can be formalized by defining the notion of
infoset-action history of player i (AIHi), and
requiring that for each i’s infoset I , all histories
within I have the same AIHi. In contrast, FOGs
have perfect recall by definition — this is triv-
ial since the players’ strategies are defined over
their observation-action histories.
Strategic equivalence: Intuitively, we think
of two games as strategically equivalent if solv-
ing one gives a recipe for solving the other, and
vice versa. Since properly formalizing this no-
tion would be outside of the scope of this text,
we use a weaker version of equivalence. In the
remainder of this section, we denote the ob-
jects coming from a specific game by putting
the game into the object’s upper index. Let E
and G be two N -player games (EFG, POSG,
or other, not necessarily both of the same type)
with policy/strategy spaces ΣEi , Σ
G
i and utility
functions uEi (·), uGi (·). E and G are strategically equivalent if there is a mapping Φ = (Φi)N ,
Φi : Σ
E
i → ΣGi s.t. each Φi is a bijection which preserves utilities (i.e. uGi (Φ(σ)) = uEi (σ)).
(However, our proof of Theorem 3.1 actually gives a stronger equivalence between E and G by
embedding E into G and showing that this suffices for the strategic equivalence defined above.)
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Theorem 3.1 (Equivalence of timeable perfect-recall EFGs and finite-horizon POSGs).
(i) Any timeable EFG E with perfect recall is strategically equivalent to some finite-horizon POSG
G (and hence FOG) for which |WG| ≤ |HE |2.
(ii) Every FOG has perfect recall and is 1-timeable, i.e. timeable where each transition takes
exactly 1 unit of time. Some EFGs satisfy neither and therefore cannot be modeled as FOGs.
(iii) Any FOG G with finite-horizon T is strategically equivalent to some timeable EFG E with
perfect recall for which |ZE | ≤ (AN |W|)T , where A := maxi,w ∣∣AGi (w)∣∣.
The full proof of Theorem 3.1 is in Appendix C. Statement (iii) is related to (Oliehoek et al., 2006)
studying the transformation of POSGs to EFGs. The idea behind (i) is using the following lemma to
make the EFG 1-timeable and show that the strategic equivalence is preserved in a FOG obtained by
copying the structure of the EFG, adding dummy actions for non-acting players, and observing newly
entered information sets. This also yields an exact formula for the size ofWG from (i).
Lemma 3.2 (Reformulation of Lemma C.8). Every τ -timeable EFG E, for integer-valued τ , is
strategically equivalent to 1-timeable EFG E′ with |HE′ | = |HE |+∑ha τ(h, a, ha).
Figure 1 shows a game where Lemma C.8 leads to a quadratic increase in size.
3.2 POSGs and Models for Reinforcement Learning
There are many formalizations and variants of POSGs in the literature (Peshkin et al., 2000; Hansen
et al., 2004b; Emery-Montemerlo et al., 2004; Horak and Bosansky, 2019). However, they all
share the underlying idea of multiple agents acting simultaneously, receiving some reward, and —
depending on the chosen joint action — stochastically transitioning to a different state that they only
view through partial observations. The model we propose isn’t novel; rather it is strongly inspired
by formalisms such as (Hansen et al., 2004b; Emery-Montemerlo et al., 2004). Except for using
a different letter to denote the underlying (world-)state-space, the two main differences are that
each observation O(w, a,w′) is determined by the transition (w, a,w′), rather than depending on it
stochastically, and that each observation is factored into the private and public part. This explicit
labeling of some information as public has been inspired by poker but also appears in the POSG
literature (Foerster et al., 2018; Horak and Bosansky, 2019). In particular, the Factored-Observation
Game model is a special case of the POSG model, and any algorithm that can be applied to POSGs
also works for FOGs. However, we believe the algorithmic benefits of public states are so important
that one should distinguish between this model and a general POSG, which is why we give the
formalism a distinct name.
While FOGs are a special case of POSGs, the assumptions made by FOGs don’t restrict their
generality. Indeed, one can model a general POSG within FOGs by adding a hidden variable to the
world-state (which emulates stochastic observations) and moving the public part of every observation
into the private ones. Regarding the connections to the models used in RL, FOG therefore inherits all
the properties of POSGs. Among single-agent problems, fully-observable FOGs coincide with MDPs
and the general case coincides with POMDPs. It isn’t surprising that fully-observable multiagent
FOGs coincide with stochastic games, while the general case yields POSGs. However, we also get
Dec-POMDPs, which are formally a special case of POSGs. Dec-POMDPs are a framework for
studying decentralized cooperation problems, and they have received a large amount of attention
since 2000.
4 Sub-game Decomposition
In this section, we explore the connections between the objective, subjective, and public points of
view. We also show how public states can be used to decompose FOGs into smaller independent
problems.
Recall thatH denotes the set of histories, Si the set of information states, and Spub the set of public
states. When the FOG model is known, a history h conveys more information than the corresponding
information state si ∈ Si, which in turns conveys more information than the corresponding public
state. In this sense, the mappings si : H → Si, spub : Si → Spub and spub : H → Spub can be viewed
as projections, and we have “sSipub ◦ si = sHpub” (see Figure 7 for illustration). We use the following
notation to talk about all histories that correspond to the same information state or public state:
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Definition 4.1 (Information set). For si ∈ Si, Ii(si) := {h ∈ H | si(h) = si} denotes the
information set corresponding to si. For s ∈ Spub, Ipub(s) := {h ∈ H | spub(h) = s} denotes the
public set corresponding to s. By Ii := {Ii(si) | si ∈ Si} and Ipub := {Ipub(s) | s ∈ Spub} we
denote the information partition of i, resp. the public partition.
Since the mappings Ii : Si → Ii and Ipub : Spub → Ipub are bijections, we use Ii 7→ si(Ii) and
Ipub 7→ spub(Ipub) to denote the corresponding inverse mappings. Since it is possible to compose many
of these mappings together, we overload this notation using the “target_object_type(starting_object)”
convention — for example, we set Ii(h) := Ii(si(h)) and Ipub(Ii) := (Ipub ◦ spub ◦ si)(Ii) = the
(uniquely defined) public set which contains the given information set Ii. When there is no danger of
confusion, we drop the subscript i from Ii.
Similarly, we can identify each public state s ∈ Spub with the corresponding collection Si(s) :=
{si ∈ Si | spub(si) = s} of information states or information sets Ii(s) := {I ∈ Ii | spub(I) = s}.
Definition 4.2 (Subgame). Let G be an FOG. A subgame rooted at a public state s ∈ Spub is the set
G(s) := {h ∈ H | spub(h) extends s}.
While most of the ideas related to decomposition in games with imperfect information have been
developed in the EFG framework (augmented information sets, public states, and subgames, defined
in (Burch et al., 2014; Johanson et al., 2011; Moravcˇík et al., 2017; Šustr et al., 2019)), this has been
done in a patchwork-manner — indeed, for example the observation that public states are the roots
of subgames has only been written down recently (Šustr et al., 2019), even though the connection
should be an obvious one. Moreover, these recent definitions did not succeed at capturing the intuitive
notions of private and public information, because the augmented information sets of (Burch et al.,
2014) delay the non-acting player’s information until the last possible moment:
Claim 4.3. The augmented information sets defined in the literature are unintuitive, unsuited for
online play, and produce unnecessarily large subgames.
Figure 2: A domain where the finest partition isn’t
unique. Classical information sets of player4 are
solid, the augmented information sets (when the
player is inactive) of player4 are dashed.
For an example and further details which prove
this claim, as well as the proofs of the remaining
results, see Appendix E or (Kovarik and Lisy,
2019). In light of this negative result, it is nat-
ural to try and come up with a definition which
would avoid these shortcomings. However, this
is impossible to do, since the EFG model doesn’t
contain enough information to derive the infor-
mation of the non-active player. Indeed, one can
find two real-world tasks with different struc-
ture of information, which however naturally
correspond to the same EFG model:
Claim 4.4. In general, it is impossible to derive
the “correct” augmented information sets from
the EFG model.
Of course, one might try some promising approach anyway; a good example would be to “learn
everything as soon as possible”, which corresponds to defining Iaugi as “the finest partition ofH that
is consistent with Ii”. Unfortunately, this fails because of the following negative result which shows
that it is impossible to find a general formula for “the most informative Iaugi ”:
Lemma 4.5. For some games, there is no single finest partition ofH consistent with Ii.
Proof. The game in Figure 2 illustrates that there doesn’t always exist a unique solution to the problem
of finding information partitions that cannot be refined any further while remaining consistent with
Ii. It shows that sometimes a choice has to be made about which information to reveal early.
5 Counterfactual Regret Minimization
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al., 2007) is an algorithm for approximately
solving two-player, zero-sum games by finding an approximation of a Nash equilibrium. It fits into
7
the general category of a policy improvement algorithm, and can be compactly described as self-play
with independent instances of the regret-matching algorithm (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000) operating
over the actions at each information state for each player, using a particular notion of expected reward
for the actions, the counterfactual value.
Counterfactual values for player i are defined in terms of a probability Ppi−i of i’s opponents and the
transition function generating the history9. That is,
Ppi−i(h) := PT (h)
∏
j∈N\{i}
Ppij (h) (5.1)
where PT (h) and Ppij (h) are the contributions of chance and player j, respectively, to the probability
of generating h
PT (h) :=
∏
h′awvh
T (h′, a, w), Ppij (h) :=
∏
h′awvh
pij(sj(h
′), aj) (5.2)
We now define the state value vpii (h
′) as the expected future reward under policy pi to player i
conditional on the environment having generated the given history. The action value qpii (h, ai) is
defined analogously, except that i first takes the action ai:
qpii (h, ai) := E
w∼T ,aj 6=i∼pi
[Ri(h, a) + vpii (haw)] , where (5.3)
vpii (haw) := E
a′∼pi, w′∼T (w,a′), a′′∼pi, ...
[Ri(w, a′) +Ri(w′, a′′) + . . . ] . (5.4)
The counterfactual-weighted action value for player i of action a ∈ Ai at state s ∈ Si is
qpii,c(s, a) :=
∑
h∈Ii(s)
Ppi−i(h)q
pi
i (h, a) (5.5)
Having these counterfactual-weighted action values, we define the corresponding counterfactual
weighted state values as
vpii,c(s) :=
∑
a∈Ai(s)
pii(s, a)q
pi
i,c(s, a) (5.6)
Note that counterfactual values are not conditional on reaching the state, as is standard in rein-
forcement learning, but instead depend, in a particular way, on the probability of reaching the
state.
Given a strategy sequence pi0, . . . , pit−1, the accumulated regret at time t for an action a at state s is
Rti(s, a) =
t−1∑
k=0
(
qpi
k
i,c (s, a)− vpi
k
i,c (s)
)
(5.7)
Denoting (x)+ := max(x, 0), the policy at time t is defined by the regret-matching algorithm:
pit(s, a) =
{
(Rti(s, a))
+/
∑
a′∈A(s)(R
t
i(s, a
′))+ if
∑
a′ R
t
i(s, a
′) > 0
1
|A(s)| otherwise
(5.8)
In the original context of two-player, zero-sum, perfect recall EFGs, Zinkevich et al. (2007) show that
the profile of average policies 1t
∑t−1
t′=0 pi
t′
i is an O(maxi |Si|
√|A|i/√t)-approximation to a Nash
equilibrium. While we cannot use the equivalence between EFG and FOG from Theorem 3.1 to apply
the CFR result to FOG, we can follow the steps of the proof for any finite, two-player, zero-sum FOG,
noting that all FOGs have perfect recall. Applying regret-matching to counterfactual values at every
state (action-observation history) will still minimize counterfactual regret, and we maintain the same
recursive structure where counterfactual value of an action can be expressed in terms of the expected
counterfactual values of the descendants. Finally, the folk theorem linking regret to the distance from
NE is a consequence of strategic equivalence constructed in Theorem 3.1.
9This weighting is the reason for the name: leaving out the player’s probability of generating the history is
equivalent to weighting by the probability of generating the history, if we considered the counterfactual situation
where player i instead follows a policy which deterministically makes the actions which generate the history.
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6 Conclusion
In light of the recent breakthroughs in large variants of poker, one would hope to take the algorithmic
ideas that allowed these advances, and bring them to the attention of the multiagent learning commu-
nity, to the expected benefit of research in both areas. Unfortunately, this effort has been hindered
by the very formalism that carried the poker research through more than 60 years – EFGs. As we
show in Section 4 and Appendix E, the EFG model is not suitable for decomposition, which is a key
concept behind the recent poker milestones.
We thus introduced a variant of a POSG, called FOG, to serve as the bridging formalism between the
two communities. FOGs are general enough to represent any POSG, and Theorem 3.1 shows that any
reasonable EFG can be modeled as a FOG. Furthermore, we provide an extensive discussion on the
design choices of the proposed model (Appendix B) and discuss connections and mapping to existing
models in more detail (Appendix C). To visualize the introduced formalism and contrast it to EFGs,
Appendix F contains a graphical comparison of EFGs and FOGs on a small poker example.
To illustrate that FOGs can indeed be used to bring over the recent insights to the multiagent RL
side of solving partially-observable multiagent problems, Section 4 and Appendix D show that
decomposition is straightforward in FOGs and has intuitive properties, Section 5 presents the CFR
algorithm within FOGs, and Appendix A shows the FOG variant of the sequence form.
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A FOG Sequence Form
Sequence-form representation is a prominent method in EFGs, as it allows for effective solving of
two-player zero-sum EFGs by linear programming (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008; Nisan et al.,
2007). In this section, we describe a sequence-form representation of a FOG. We keep the structure
and notation close to the the sequence form representation of EFGs as presented in (Nisan et al.,
2007).
Recall that the letter Z is used to denote the set of all terminal trajectories. For z ∈ Z , ui(z) denotes
the corresponding utility of i, that is, the reward accumulated on trajectory z:
ui(z) =
∑
hawvz
Ri(h, a, w). (A.1)
We use Bi := {sa | s ∈ Si, a ∈ Ai(s)} to denote the set of all action-observation sequences
of a player i that end in an action and set bi(ha) := si(h)a. For a fixed policy pi, the sequence
form realization probability of a sequence sa ∈ Bi is
∏
s′a′vsa pii(s
′, a′). In a two-player FOG,
we use x and y to denote the vectors of these quantities for all such sequences of player 1 and 2
respectively. The sequence-form payoff matrix A ∈ RB1×B2 of the first player consists of entries
Aστ for σ ∈ B1, τ ∈ B2 where
Aστ =
∑
z=haw∈Z : b1(ha)=σ,b2(ha)=τ
PT (z)u1(z). (A.2)
Using this notation, the expected utility under pi can be rewritten in terms of realization plans as
Ez [ui(z) | pi] = x>Ay. (A.3)
Analogously to (Nisan et al., 2007, Proposition 3.10), one can show that a vector x = (xsa)sa∈Bi is
a realization plan corresponding to some policy pi if and only if it is non-negative and satisfies the
following two properties:
x∅ = 1 (A.4)∑
a′∈A(sao)
xsaoa′ = xsa. (A.5)
Reorganizing (A.4) and (A.5), we can be compactly express these equations using sparse ±1-valued
matrices E,F and vectors e, f (Nisan et al., 2007, Section 3.10):
Ex = e, x ≥ 0 (A.6)
Fy = f, y ≥ 0. (A.7)
Similarly to (Nisan et al., 2007, Theorem 3.13), an approximate NE of a two-player perfect-
information zero-sum FOG can by computed by the LP
minimize
u,y
eTu, subject to Fy = f, ETu−Ay ≥ 0, y ≥ 0. (A.8)
B Generalizations and Design Choices behind FOGs
In this section, we list some of the useful generalizations and special cases of the FOG model and
discuss the design choices behind the definition of the FOG model.
B.1 Generalizations of the FOG model
• Observations shared between a subset of players: As a straightforward generalization of
the FOG model, we can assume that the observation function is of the form O = (OP )P⊂N
and each player receives the observation Oi = (OP )i∈P⊂N . This is useful for modelling
games such as Hanabi or ≥ 3-player strategic computer games.
• Observation consisting of features: Additionally, we can assume that each OP (w, a,w′)
consists of pairs o = (f, x) =: (o(f), o(x)) (called elementary observations), where
f :W ×A×W → Xf is some feature in G (typically Xf = R) and x = f(w, a,w′) is
E’s value. Some example features are: Which figure stands at B3 (in chess)? Which two
private cards am I holding (in poker)? Whose turn is it (in chess)? Which state are we at (i.e.
the identity onW)? How much reward did I just get?
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• Chance player: There is an extra player c, called chance or nature. Chance has its actions
Ac and observations Oc, but its strategy pic is fixed (and hence there is no need to define its
rewards).
• Instead of all players taking an action at each state, a player function P : w ∈ W 7→
P(w) ⊂ {1, . . . , N} determines the set of players that act. We have Ai(w) = ∅ ⇐⇒ i /∈
P(w). The player might still receive observations when inactive, but they do not write down
any action. We assume that each player can deduce from Ii(h) whether he acts at h or not.
• Stochastic observations: Rather than being a deterministic function of the transition
(w, a,w′), we might have O(w, a,w′) ∈ ∆(O). This is an important assumption for
example in robotics.
B.2 Discussion of the Design Choices behind the FOG model
Explicitly labeling some information as public: To see why this is useful, let us first describe
the difference between common knowledge (among the active agents) and what we call “public
knowledge”. A piece of information is common knowledge if everybody knows it, everybody knows
that everybody knows it, and so on. Public knowledge can be viewed as a stronger version of this
notion, where the fact that a piece of information is common knowledge is explicitly labeled with the
information. Examples of public knowledge are real-world group conversations or CC’ed emails.
Conversely, if a conversation with a friend reveals that we have both seen the same movie, the contents
of the movie become a common, but not public, knowledge among us (however this requires some
steps of inference as opposed to having seen the movie together). While it is unclear how to define
common-knowledge states, common-knowledge sets Ick can be formally defined as the smallest
possible subsets ofH closed under the membership within Ii for all i.
Remark B.1. Checking for identical public information is much cheaper than checking for identical
common-knowledge.
In principle, we could always assume that all observations are private, and only consider Ick. However,
this would only work for model-based agents, and even then, verifying whether two histories belong to
the same Ick can be very costly. Indeed, sometimes the easiest way to check whether Ick(g) = Ick(h)
might be to start with the set {g} and keep adding histories which belong to the same information set
for one of the players until the procedure terminates. This builds up the whole common-knowledge
state, and we check whether h belongs to it. Even assuming that iterating over the elements of a
given information set isn’t expensive, we might have to do this roughly |Ick|-times. One only needs
to contrast this with public states, where verifying whether spub(g) = spub(h) has the complexity
Ω(len(g)) (it suffices to go through the sequences of transitions that make up g and h, and see whether
they generate the same sequence of public observations).
On the other hand, many domains naturally contain public observations: In board games and card
games, essentially everything (except for cards that are viewed secretly) is observed publicly. In
2-player StarCraft, hostile units (with the same view range) that see each other do it “publicly”. In
Kriegspiel (blind chess), the fact that a player took an action, or when one of the figures gets captured,
this fact always get observed by both players. Ultimately, common-knowledge sets generate finer
partitions and smaller subgames that are easier to solve, but the required computational and mental
overhead lead us to prefer public states as the canonical choice for handling decomposition.
No player function: When defining the model, one faces the choice between letting all players
act at every state and having a player function that decides who is active. Since all active players
remember submitting an action, they all “see the time passing”. It follows that unless the game is
1-timeable (i.e., timeable with transitions that last exactly 1 unit of time), making all players active
will create a game that is not strategically equivalent (Appendix C). This has two consequences: firstly,
the FOG formalism cannot represent non-timeable games. Since these games are quite pathological
and not of particular interest (Jakobsen et al., 2016a), we view this as good news. Second, timeable
games first have to be “padded” to become 1-timeable (Lemma C.8), which increases their size.
Luckily, card and board games and most other games are naturally 1-timeable, so this doesn’t become
an issue in practice. The main drawback of this choice thus becomes the fact that having a player
function would be more natural in turn-based games such as chess.
Rewards are non-observable by default: Formally, this assumption comes at no cost since re-
wards can always be added into observations (Appendix B). As mentioned in Section 2, non-
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observable rewards correspond to the intuition “rewards as changes in the value of world-state” while
observable rewards are closer to the standard RL intuition of “rewards as pain/pleasure signals”.
Consequently, we believe the main cost lies in this discrepancy between the meaning of rewards in
model-based and model-free approaches. However, this can also be viewed as a benefit since this
discrepancy already exists and being explicit about it gets rid of some of the surrounding confusion.
Moreover, this avoids some of the drawbacks of the observable rewards: namely, there are many
situations where we wish to assign rewards to unobserved consequences, such as an attacker stealing
data in network security games. While one can push the reward signal to a later time when the attack
gets revealed, delaying the feedback slows down learning and causes complications for discounted
rewards. Arguably, it might also incentivize agents to prevent negative rewards altogether by “hiding
from bad news” or “wireheading” (Everitt and Hutter, 2016).
Other choices:
• Observations describe changes in the world-state (rather than describing the world-state
directly): Since strategy takes into account all observations, an observation Oi(w, a,w′)
only needs to describe the difference between w and w′, rather than full w′. This is arguably
more intuitive in some games (e.g. chess) and reduces bandwidth and memory usage of the
agents. Moreover, there are games where legal actions naturally depend on history (e.g. ko
in Go).
• No chance player: In EFGs, randomness of the environment is represented by a chance
player whose strategy is fixed. While the chance player is redundant with a stochastic
transition function (Appendix C), our main reason for not considering chance is to make
the model familiar to people used to the MDP setting. On the other hand, adding chance
is necessary for direct backward compatibility with EFGs, and it is way more intuitive for
modeling e.g. AI-controlled players in computer games.
• Only some actions are legal at each state: We keep this assumption since it seems crucial
to achieving at least some compatibility with the EFG literature.
• Designated starting point w0: Some authors instead assume a prior distribution overW .
This is formally equivalent since w0 can be a dummy node that emulates this prior.
C Mapping and Connections to Existing Models: Details and Proofs
Correspondence between EFGs and FOGs: The goal of this section is to show that exactly
timeable EFGs with perfect recall are strategically equivalent to finite-horizon FOG, and vice versa.
We now define the related concepts, expand on the exact correspondence, and give its proof.
Intuitively, two games are strategically equivalent if solving one gives a recipe for solving the other,
and vice versa. Since formalizing this notion would be outside of the scope of this text, we use a
weaker version of equivalence: Let E and G be two N -player games (EFG, FOG, or others, not
necessarily both of the same type) with strategy spaces ΣEi , Σ
G
i and optimization criteria u
E
i (·), uGi (·).
We say that E and G are strategically equivalent if there is a mapping Φ = (Φi)N , Φi : ΣEi → ΣGi
s.t. each Φi is a bijection which preserves utilities (i.e. uGi (Φ(σ)) = u
E
i (σ)). In our proofs, we
actually show a stronger equivalence that takes into account the structural properties of E and G.
Timeability: Informally, a game is timeable if each agent has access to a global clock. This notion
comes from (Jakobsen et al., 2016b), who formalize it for EFGs as follows:
Definition C.1 ((Jakobsen et al., 2016b)). For an EFG E, deterministic timing is a mapping ψ :
HE → [0,∞) such that the label of any node is at least one higher than the label of its parent. A
deterministic timing is exact if any two nodes in the same information set have the same label.
While it is debatable whether the intuition of timeability is better captured by “ψ(node) ≥ ψ(parent)+
1” or “ψ(node) > ψ(parent)”, the two are equivalent for finite domains.
Recall that to make the definition consistent with FOGs, our Section 3 we consistently generalized it as
follows: A transition inE is any triplet (h, a, ha), where h ∈ H, a ∈ A(h). A transition-timing inE
is any mapping τ that assigns to each triplet its duration τ(h, a, ha) ∈ [1,∞). A timing corresponding
to τ is ϕτ : H → [0,∞) : h = (h0, a0, h1, . . . , ht) 7→ τ(h0, a0, h1) + · · · + τ(ht−1, at−1, ht).
Inspired by (Jakobsen et al., 2016b), we say that E is τ -timeable if every two histories from the
same information set have the same timing ϕτ (·).
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RL EFG FOG
The actor in the task.
i agent i player i agent, player
The acting rule.
pi policy σ ∈ Σ strategy pi / σ policy / strategy
A measure of how long the task takes.
T finite horizon D game depth T finite horizon
The basic notion for describing the “state of the world”.
s ∈ S state h ∈ H history w ∈ W world state
A list of everything that has happened so far, from the objective point of view.
– trajectory h ∈ H history h ∈ H history
Information based on which actors select their next actions.
s
b
state (MDP)
belief (POMDP) I ∈ Ii information set si ∈ Si
action-observation
sequence
The immediate feedback on how well the actor is currently doing.
r reward doesn’t exist Ri(s, a) reward
The optimization criterion.
cumulative reward ui utility cumulative reward
The desirability of a given situation for an actor who uses a given acting rule.
V pi(s) value of s under pi – expected utility at h vσi (h) value of a history
The cause of non-determinism in the task.
T (s,a) transition prob. σc(h, a) chance strategy T (w, a) transition prob.
The probability of ending up in a given situation.
piσ(h) reach probability ηpi(h) reach probability
Table 1: A “dictionary” of the basic concepts of MDPs (and other models used in RL), EFGs, and
FOGs. The correspondence is on the level of usage; for example, the correspondence between a state
in an MDP and a history in an EFG doesn’t mean that they are mathematically the same thing, but
rather that the role states play in MDPs is analogous to the role histories play in EFGs.
In FOGs, we define timeability analogously, requiring that for any histories g, h, ϕτ (g) = ϕτ (h)
holds whenever si(g) = si(h) for some agent i.
This allows us to formulate the following trivial, yet still note-worthy result:
Proposition C.2 (Timeability of EFGs and FOGs).
(i) Not all EFGs are timeable.
(ii) Every FOG admits a timing under which all transitions take exactly 1 unit of time.
In particular, histories that correspond to the same information state have the same length.
Proof. For an example of a non-timeable domain, see (Jakobsen et al., 2016b). To prove (ii), recall
every player takes an action in each state, so they can always look at how many actions they have
submitted so far, and thus infer the number of transitions that have occurred. This shows that constant
ψ1 is always an exact deterministic timing.
Example C.3. Making everybody act at each state can leak information.
Suppose we are playing a “game” between a merchant caravan and bandits. The bandits decide
between doing nothing and preparing an ambush in the forest, which takes 1 additional action (to
find a hiding place). The merchants then decide to go through the forest or take the long way around.
When modeling the game as a FOG (or a POSG), the merchants do not directly observe anything
about the bandits. However, they do know how many of the “do nothing for 1 turn” actions they were
asked to submit. They use this information to infer the bandits’ strategy and never get ambushed as a
result.
Perfect recall Informally, an agent has perfect recall if they always remember all the information
they had in the past (Kuhn, 1953). In EFGs, authors often define perfect recall informally as each
player remembers his past actions and information sets. This can be formalized by defining the notion
of infoset-action history of player i, and requiring that “for each i’s infoset I , all histories within I
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have the same AIHi. In contrast, FOGs have perfect recall by definition — this is trivial since the
players’ strategies are defined over their observation-action histories. As with timeability, this implies
that not all EFGs can be meaningfully represented as FOGs:
Proposition C.4. (i) Not all EFGs have perfect recall. (ii) Every FOG has perfect recall.
Proof. A classic example of a (one player) EFG without perfect recall is the absent-minded driver
problem. The second part is trivial, as noted above.
Having clarified the negative results, we are ready to get started with the proof of the correspondence
between EFGs and FOGs:
Theorem 3.1 (Equivalence of timeable perfect-recall EFGs and finite-horizon POSGs).
(i) Any timeable EFG E with perfect recall is strategically equivalent to some finite-horizon POSG
G (and hence FOG) for which |WG| ≤ |HE |2.
(ii) Every FOG has perfect recall and is 1-timeable, i.e. timeable where each transition takes
exactly 1 unit of time. Some EFGs satisfy neither and therefore cannot be modeled as FOGs.
(iii) Any FOG G with finite-horizon T is strategically equivalent to some timeable EFG E with
perfect recall for which |ZE | ≤ (AN |W|)T , where A := maxi,w ∣∣AGi (w)∣∣.
The case (ii) follows from Propositions C.2 and C.4. We now prove (iii), and the remainder of the
section presents the proof of (i).
h1
g1
1 0
h2
g2
1 0
h3
g3
1 0 1 0 0 1
. .
.
. .
.
. .
. . . . hN−1
gN−1 gN
Figure 3: In this two-player EFG, the dotted nodes do not exist, and transitioning from hn to gn by
going left takes N − n units of time. By adding the dotted nodes, we modify the game s.t. each
transition takes exactly 1 unit of time. However, this increases the size of the game from linear in N
to quadratic in N .
Remark C.5 (Optimality of Theorem 3.1). Assuming a better definition of strategic equivalence, the
bounds from Theorem 3.1 are likely optimal. For specific games, a tighter exact formula follows from
Lemma C.8.
In practice, the size of many domains will not increase by “FOG-ization” at all, but there are also
non-artificial domains with up to D/2-fold increase, where D is the depth of the EFG. This happens
in games which are typically short but have a small chance of containing long sequences of actions
whose existence isn’t known to the opponent. For example in the game of phantom tic-tac-toe,
placing one’s mark can be preceded by up to 4 attempted “illegal moves”. To prevent information
leaks, the FOG needs to be “padded” such that all indistinguishable nodes have the same length,
which increases the size nearly four times. Since the quadratic bound in the first part of Theorem 3.1
is derived from Lemma C.8 (as the worst case), one can also use the lemma directly to obtain an
exact formula for the size increase caused by our method. Figure 3 depicts a domain where the
increase truly is of the quadratic order. Strictly speaking, Theorem 3.1 is not optimal, since our
version of strategic equivalence doesn’t take into account the structure of the games, and one could
find a strategically equivalent matrix game. While this looseness could be fixed by finding a better
formalization of strategic equivalence, the value of doing so currently doesn’t seem very high. For
more information on “EFG-ization” of POSGs, we refer the reader to (Oliehoek et al., 2006).
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Proof of Theorem 3.1 (iii). Let G =
〈N ,S, w0, T ,R,O〉 be a finite-horizon FOG. We turn G into
an EFG E =
〈HE ,ZE ,AE ,N ,PE , σc, u, IE〉 by unpacking simultaneous decisions of G into
sequential ones, replacing stochastic transition probabilities by the chance player’s actions, and
pushing rewards into leaves:
• Histories: For every non-terminal h = (w0, . . . , wt) ∈ H, HE \ ZE contains histories
ha1 . . . ai−1, where i ∈ {1, . . . , N} ∪ {N + 1}, ai ∈ Ai(wt). ZE coincides with the set
of all terminal histories in G.
• The player function is defined as PE(ha1 . . . ai−1) := i for i = 1, . . . , N and
PE(ha1 . . . aN ) := c.
• IEi : A player i can’t tell ha1 . . . ai−1 apart from gb1 . . . bi−1 in E iff they can’t tell h apart
from g in G.
• Actions and σc: For non-chance nodes, the successors are defined in the obvious way.
For ha1 . . . aN , the chance’s actions are all the states wt+1 with σc(ha1 . . . aN , wt+1) :=
T (wt, (a1, . . . , aN ), wt+1) > 0, and taking wt+1 transitions the game into the history
ha1 . . . aNw
t+1.
• Utility: For terminal histories, we define ui(z) := Gi(z).
This makes E a well-defined EFG. Moreover, the mappings Φi : ha1 . . . ai−1 7→ h induce a bijection
between strategies in E and policies in G, and the expected utility of any strategy profile in E
coincides with the expected cumulative reward of the corresponding policy profile in G (this is
straightforward for pure strategies, and the general case follows).
Remark C.6. Making the “EFG-ization” less wasteful.
The EFG representation is typically less efficient than the FOG representation: firstly, the “sequential-
ization” of simultaneous decisions is wasteful. Second, when the state-space W of G is cyclic, the
number of histories in G might be exponential in |W| and G’s finite horizon T . Since the size of G’s
model is proportional to |W|, rather than |H|, this makes the FOG description much more compact.
To make the EFG representation less wasteful, we can ignore players whose “decision” is a trivial
one — in practice, this would mean only adding i’s decision nodes if |Ai(wt)| > 2, and only adding
a chance node if the probability T (wt, a) isn’t trivial (i.e. concentrated in a single point).
We now prepare the ground for proving the remaining part of the theorem.
Lemma C.7. Any timeable EFG has a an exact deterministic timing with values in {0, . . . , |H| − 1}.
Proof. Let ψ : HE → [0,∞) be an exact deterministic timing. We enumerate {t0, . . . , tN} :=
{ψ(h) | h ∈ HE} s.t. tn < tn+1. We necessarily have N ≤ |HE | − 1. For h ∈ HE , we denote
ϕ(h) := n for the integer n satisfying ψ(h) = tn. By definition of ϕ, we have ϕ(g) = ϕ(h)
iff ψ(g) = ψ(h). Since ψ is a deterministic timing, we have h v h′ =⇒ ϕ(h) ≤ ϕ(h′). It
follows that ϕ is an exact deterministic timing that satisfies {ϕ(h) | h ∈ HE} = {0, . . . , N} ⊂
{0, . . . , |HE | − 1}.
For a fixed integer-valued timingϕ in an EFGE and a history ha ∈ HE (where h ∈ HE , a ∈ AE(h)),
we denote by τϕ(ha) := (ϕ(ha)− ϕ(h))− 1 the number of “missing” time-stamps between ha and
its parent. In this sense, the “length” of the transition from h to ha via a is 1 + τϕ(ha).
Lemma C.8 (Padding an EFG with non-unit transitions). For any EFG E with exact deterministic
integer-valued timing ϕ, there exists a strategically equivalent EFG E′ with transition length 1 and
|HE′ | = |HE |+∑ha τϕ(ha).
Proof. Let E and ϕ be as in the lemma. For every h ∈ HE and a ∈ AE(h), we formally add toHE′
the nodes h, han for n = 1, . . . , τϕ(ha), and ha. (If h as already been added as h′a′ for its parent h′,
we don’t add it for the second time.) In E′-histories of the form h and ha, both the acting player and
available actions are as in E. The chance player acts in all the nodes of the form han, and he only
has a single noop action. The transitions in E′ work as follows: h
ay ha1
noop
y . . .
noop
y han
noop
y ha.
The remaining objects in E′ (player set, information partitions, utilities) are as in E.
The identity mappings h ∈ HE 7→ h ∈ HE′ and a ∈ AE(h) 7→ a ∈ AE′(h) induce an isomorphism
between strategies inE andE′, which shows thatE andE′ are strategically equivalent. Moreover, the
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deterministic timing ψ : h ∈ HE′ 7→ the number of actions taken between the root ofHE′ and h is
exact in E′. We conclude the proof by noting that the length of every transition in E′ is 1, and that
HE′ has the desired size.
Together with Lemma C.7, this gives the following corollary:
Corollary C.9 (The padding is quadratic). Any timeable EFG E admits a strategically equivalent
timeable EFG E′ with transition length 1 and |HE′ | ≤ |HE |2.
Lemma C.10. Any perfect-recall EFG E that is timeable with transitions of length 1 is strategically
equivalent to a finite-horizon FOG of the same size.
Proof. The basic ideas behind the construction are the following:
• The histories in E turn into states in G. The players who originally didn’t act in h now do
act, but they can only take a noop action “do nothing for 1 turn”. The transitions in G work
as in E.
• For non-terminal transitions, players receive no reward. A transition to a terminal state z
givesRi(·, ·, z) := ui(z).
• In terminal states, players observe their utility. For h ∈ I ∈ Ii where i acts, we have
Oi(·, ·, h) = I and Oj(·, ·, h) := “not your turn” for j 6= i.
• Chance is transformed into stochastic transitions via T (h, (noop)Ni=1, ha) := σc(h, a).
Since the utilities in E and rewards in G coincide, it remains to show that for each i, the information
sets that “matter strategically” (where i has more than one action) are the same for E and G.
Suppose that g, h ∈ HE both belong to I ∈ IEi . By perfect recall, the infoset-action sequences
corresponding to g and h are the same. The corresponding observation-action sequences si(g), si(h)
will additionally have some number of noop actions and dummy observations after each “proper”
action. Since E is exactly-timeable with transitions of length 1, this number will be the same for g
and h, and thus si(g) = si(h) and we have Ii(g) = Ii(h) in G as well. In the opposite direction,
clearly a history with Ai(h) = {noop} can only be in an information set with other such histories
(since entering such histories produces the “not your turn” observation). Moreover, when i enters
a history that is “strategically relevant”, they receive the current E-infoset as an observation. This
proves that IGi (g) = I
G
i (h) =⇒ IEi (g) = IEi (h), thereby showing the bijection between ΣE and
ΣG. (Since HE = WG is finite and the transition function in G doesn’t allow cycles, G is a FOG
with finite horizon |HE |.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 ((i)). Let E be a timeable EFG. By Corollary C.9, we can assume that E has
transitions of length 1 — although this comes at the cost of increasing the size of H to |H|2. By
Lemma C.10, E is strategically equivalent to a finite-horizon FOG, at no additional size-increase.
Note that turning an EFG E into an FOG G and back into EFG E doesn’t change the game in any
way, i.e. E′ = E. However, turning a FOG G into an EFG E and then back into a FOG will produce
a G′ that can differ from G. This is because the “FOG-ization” doesn’t turn sequential decisions into
simultaneous ones, and doesn’t roll-up the EFG back into the cyclic state-space.
D Decomposition in FOGs: Details
An important feature of the POSG formalism is that the subgames satisfy the following proposition,
which can be viewed as a mathematical version of the claim “Figure 7 is a correct way of understanding
the relationship between histories, information states and public states in a FOG”.
Proposition D.1 (Properties of subgames). For a history h0 ∈ H, s = spub(h0) and H ⊂ H, the
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) H is the smallest set containing h0 and closed under descendants in H and membership
within public sets.
(ii) H = {g ∈ H | g extends some h ∈ Ipub(s)}.
(iii) H =
⋃{Ii(s′i) | s′i extends some si ∈ Si(s)}.
(iv) H = G(s) =
⋃{Ipub(s′) | s′ extends s}.
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Moreover, for such H we have: (v) H is closed under descendants in H and membership within
information sets.10
Proof. The “moreover” part follows from, e.g., (i), because closure under the membership within
public states automatically implies closure under the membership within information sets. Indeed,
if two histories belong to the same information set, they produce the same sequence of private and
public observations (and actions), and hence they trivially also produce the same sequence of public
observations, i.e., they belong to the same public state.
Denote by H1, H2, H3, and G(s) the sets from (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). The inclusion H1 ⊃ H2 is
trivial. Note also that the second identity in (iv) always holds since g ∈ Ipub(s′) ⇐⇒ spub(g) = s′.
For H2 ⊃ G(s), suppose that spub(h0) = (O0, . . . , Ot) and g′ = (s0, a0, . . . , st′) ∈ G(s). Since
by definition of G(s), spub(g′) extends spub(h0), we have spub(g) = (O1, . . . , Ot, . . . , Ot
′
) for some
t′ ≥ t. The history g := (s0, a0, . . . , st) @ g′ witnesses that g′ ∈ H2.
To see that G(s) ⊃ H1, note that G(s) is a set containing h0 and closed under both the membership
within public states (by definition) and descendants inH (since h′ A h0 implies that spub(h′) is an
extension of spub(h0)). This yields G(s) ⊃ H1.
The identity between H3 and G(s) holds because for any s′ ∈ Spub we have Ipub(s′) =
⋃{Ii(s′i) |
s′i ∈ Si(s′)}.
1
2 1
0.5
0
1
2 −1
0.5
Figure 4: A game where (i) and (ii) from Proposition D.1 are not equivalent (for h0 := the green
player’s node). (Kovarik and Lisy, 2019)
The corollary of Proposition D.1 is that we can safely view (and search trough) subgames on the level
of histories, information states, or public states, and all these views are equivalent. This result doesn’t
hold in EFGs since some of them might fail the implication (ii) =⇒ (i) (consider the EFG from
Figure 4 with “public states = histories at the same level”). Moreover, even “well-behaved” EFGs
have the drawback of not having a notion of “agent’s information” outside of the agent’s turn. This
implies that in EFGs, the conditions (iii) and (iv) aren’t defined at all. One can attempt to remedy this
by considering augmented information sets (Burch et al., 2014), but this approach sometimes doesn’t
work as one might intuitively expect (see Appendix E).
E Problems with Decomposition in EFGs: Details and Proofs
In the classical formulation of the EFG model, the imperfect information is introduced by specifying
information sets which consist of histories between which the acting player cannot distinguish. In
particular, the model doesn’t specify which information is available for the non-acting players. This
under-specification can be interpreted as a) the model only describing the active player or b) the
players receiving no information outside of their turn.
In recent years, several works extended the EFG model by describing what the players know outside
of their turn. This is helpful for search and decomposition, “resolving” sub-problems, and for online
algorithms (updating on new information without waiting for the next turn). Formally, this was done
by extending the information partitions Ii overHi to “augmented” information partitions Iaugi over
H (Burch et al., 2014), considering public states (sets closed under Iaugi for every i, Johanson et al.
10As shown in Appendix B.2, Ipub(h) isn’t necessarily the smallest set containing h closed under the
membership within information sets. (However, it is the smallest such set that a model-free agent can use.) As a
result, H needs not be the smallest set satisfying (iv).
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end
private cards
are dealt
1st round of
public cards
2nd round of
public cards
last round of
public cards
end end end
pre-flop
flop
turn
river
Figure 5: From left to right: (a): A subset of the public tree as we intuitively imagine it in the game
of limit Texas hold ’em, corresponding to a history where both players only placed the default bets.
(b) and (c): Classical (solid) and augmented (dashed) information sets of player 1 and player 2, as
defined in the classical EFG model. (d): The public states actually corresponding to these information
partitions. There are only 5 public states along this history (rather than 12 as one might intuitively
expect), and they do not even correspond to the rounds of the game.
2011) and subgames (subsets of H closed under descendants and public states Burch et al. 2014;
Šustr et al. 2019).
As we illustrate below, this approach turned out to be problematic. We claim that instead of starting
with information sets, it is more intuitive (and technically convenient) to derive information sets from
observations. For further details regarding observations in EFGs and related counterexamples, see
(Kovarik and Lisy, 2019).
Example E.1. The augmented information sets defined in the literature are unintuitive, unsuited for
online play, and produce unnecessarily large subgames.
Paraphrasing the original definition of (Burch et al., 2014), two histories g, h ∈ H are in the same
augmented information set of player i if they both generate the same sequence of information sets
and actions.11 This definition implies that the only information that a player learns between their
two successive turns T1 and T2 is their own action taken at T1, and all remaining information is
delayed until T2. If one wanted to play a perfect-information board game in this manner, all players
would have to stay outside the room where the game takes place, and only come in when it’s their
turn (upon which a referee would tell them what happened since their last turn).
This is an unsuitable design for three reasons: Firstly, our intuitive idea of how obtaining information
works in games is very different, and we risk accidentally using properties of the “intuitive” augmented
11The original definition doesn’t specify whether augmented information sets of player 1 are defined over
H2,H2 ∪Hc,H \ Z , or the wholeH. For clarity, we explicitly assume the last scenario. However, the other
interpretations suffer from similar issues.
20
information sets when thinking about the properties of those defined by (Burch et al., 2014).12 Second,
if used for online game playing where the time to make each decision is limited, these augmented
information sets do not allow the agent to effectively use his opponent’s turn to think (e.g. in poker,
the second player wouldn’t “see” the public card until their turn). Third, the public states defined as
“sets of histories closed under membership within each Iaugi ” are very unintuitive and much larger
than “what they should be” (Figure 5).
Based on the previous example, it might seem that the solution is to define augmented information
sets as “the most informative partition ofH that is still compatible with Ii”, which would ensure that
the players learn information as soon as possible. Unfortunately, there are games where this isn’t a
solution either — the reason for this is that the EFG model simply never contained the information
required to correctly define augmented sets in the first place:
Example E.2. In general, it is impossible to derive the “correct” augmented information sets from
the EFG model.
Firstly, note that the “learn everything as soon as possible” approach isn’t always suitable. Indeed,
consider a “test-taking” scenario, where a teacher comes up with test questions (1 AM), gives the test
to a student (9 AM), and the student submits their answers (9:15 AM). While the student eventually
learns the outcome of the “come up with test questions” decision, letting him know before 9 AM
would change the game substantially. (Even if we naively assume the extra thinking time would be
the only advantage gained by the early announcement.)
However, consider a hypothetical setting where the students have hacked into the teacher’s computer,
and turned on a script that automatically alerts them when a new file appears in the “Tests” folder.
The students now have the same information as before, but they have 8 more hours to prepare. Since
the EFG models describing these two scenarios are identical, it follows that when one has access
to the EFG model, but not to the original problem description, it is impossible to deduce what the
correct definition of augmented information sets.
In our view, the takeaway from these results is that the EFG model wasn’t invented with online
play or decomposition in mind, and it is therefore not reasonable to assume that it would be suited
for working with these concepts. Instead, we propose to start with the perfect-information model,
augment it by adding observations (directly as a part of the definition), and replace information sets
(i.e. sets of indistinguishable histories) by action-observation sequences. Finally, even when working
with information partitions, we have found it more fruitful to think of their elements as “sets of
histories corresponding to a specific observation-action sequence” (if nothing else, it prevents us
from considering pathological partitions that would never arise in practice). Since there POSG model
already has these properties, it seems more reasonable to adopt it, rather than modifying the EFG
model.
F Kuhn Poker Example
To get more intuition about the FOG model, we illustrate the way it views games on the example
of Kuhn poker (Kuhn, 1950). Figure 6 depicts the EFG model of this game. Note that the only
granularity in this formalism is based on histories and information sets. On the other hand, a FOG
allows for different granularity (the very reason one can decompose the games into sub-problems),
and we visualize these different views in Figure 7.
12At the very least, the author of this paragraph made this mistake.
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Figure 6: EFG representation of the Kuhn poker. Grouping of histories to infosets is depicted by the
dashed lines.
Figure 7: FOG representation of the Kuhn poker depicting different levels of information. (a) public
tree depicting publicly observable information (public view of the game) (b) action-observation
sequence tree of the first player (player 1 view of the game) (c) world state tree of the game
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